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I. INTRODUCTION
Three-year-old Breighonna Moore was severely abused and
eventually murdered by her foster parents, Michael and Laurinda
Jackson.' Breighonna died from a bilateral subdural hematoma.
Aside from the fatal head injury, she had bruises on both her ears,
near her right eye, on her buttocks, on both her arms, on the lower
quadrant of her abdomen, and on the left side of her crotch.3
Breighonna also had a vaginal injury, lacerations and abrasions inside
her mouth, and hemorrhages on both arms, her left thigh, and her
scalp.4 This horrific image is just one example of the suffering many
children experience daily.
In 1997, an estimated 984,000 children were victims of maltreat-
ment.' Furthermore, 1,196 children died as a result of this mal-
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1. Both Michael and Laurinda Jackson have pleaded guilty to second-degree murder.
Statement of Defendant, Plea Guilty, State v. Jackson, No. 93-1-02060-7 (King County Super.
Ct. Feb. 25, 2000); Statement of Defendant, Plea Guilty, State v. Jackson, No. 93-1-02061-5
(King County Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 2000).
2. State v. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d 712, 718, 976 P.2d 1229, 1231 (1999).
3. 137 Wash. 2d at 718 n.1, 976 P.2d 1231 n.1.
4. Id.
5. ADMINISTRATION ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD MALTREATMENT 1997: REPORTS FROM THE STATES TO
THE NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM, 4 (1999) <http://www.
acf.ahhs.gov/programs/cb/stats/neands97/fc.htm>. This figure is based on reports from 44
states. Id. 4.1. Forty-three states reported 440,994 victims of neglect, 197,557 victims of
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treatment. 6 Of the alarming number of children suffering maltreat-
ment, 75.4% of the perpetrators were the victim's parents.7 While the
number of children maltreated is horrifying, even more shocking is the
number of innocent children who have died at the hands of their
abuser, often their own parent.
In Washington alone, approximately 23,303 children were
victims of maltreatment in 1997; nine children died from maltreat-
ment.8 Of the 19,966 perpetrators of maltreatment reported in Wash-
ington, 15,824 were the child's parents and 542 were the child's foster
parents.9
In many of these situations, the nonabusive parent is aware that
the other parent is abusing the child or foster child. For various
reasons, the nonabusive, or passive, parent does not stop the abuse.
Most of the time, the passive parent is not held responsible for the
death of a child caused by child abuse. "When a child dies from abuse
at the hands of another, there is only a remote chance that a passive
parent will face any charges at all." 1  This situation is intolerable.
Because of the unique helplessness of children, anyone who is aware of
abuse, especially a parent or foster parent, should be held responsible
for that abuse.
While there are several arguments against holding a passive
parent responsible, they do not weigh heavily enough when a child's
life is at stake. One excuse for not holding a passive parent responsi-
ble is that it will disrupt any remaining shred of family harmony and
will precipitate the dissolution of the family unit." Another argument
is that holding passive parents responsible would have a dispropor-
tionate effect on women.' 2 Finally, it has been suggested that a child
physical abuse, 98,339 victims of sexual abuse, 49,338 victims of psychological abuse or neglect,
18,894 victims of medical neglect, and 103,576 victims of unknown and other maltreatment. Id.
4.2.
6. Id. 6.1. "Forty-one States reported that there were 967 child maltreatment fatalities in
1997. Based on these numbers, it was estimated that there were 1,196 fatalities in the 50 States
and the District of Columbia, a rate of 1.7 children per 100,000 children in the general popula-
tion or 123 child fatalities per 100,000 victims of maltreatment." Id. Fourteen of these fatalities
occurred while the child was in foster care. Id. 6.3.
7. Id. 7.1. This figure is based on data from 39 states.
8. Id. at Appendix D, Table 4.1 and Table 4.5.
9. Id. at Appendix D, Table 6.
10. Bryan A. Liang & Wendy L. Macfarlane, Murder by Omission: Child Abuse and the
Passive Parent, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 397, 445 (1999).
11. Rachel S. Zahniser, Note, Morally and Legally: A Parent's Duty to Prevent the Abuse of
a Child as Defined by Lane v. Commonwealth, 86 KY. L.J. 1209, 1231 (1997). See also Anne T.
Johnson, Criminal Liability for Parents Who Fail to Protect, 5 LAW & INEQ. J. 359 (1987); Nancy
A. Tanck, Note, Commendable or Condemnable? Criminal Liability for Parents Who Fail to
Protect Their Children from Abuse, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 659,684-85 (1987).
12. Zahniser, supra note 11, at 1231. See also Johnson, supra note 11, at 375-81; Tanck,
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may be better off with a single, nonabusive parent than in a foster
home.'3 While valid, none of these arguments, whether examined
separately or taken together, are sufficient.
None of these reasons can justify declining to prevent or report
the abuse of a child. "There is ... no logical or legal reason for failing
to charge all parents, guardians, or caretakers with murder when they
know of the abuse yet fail to protect their children." 4 "Children need
protection. They cannot protect themselves."'" The most important
reason to hold passive parents responsible is to provide this protection.
Another important reason to hold passive parents responsible for
the death of their child is to further the purposes of Washington's
criminal laws. Under Washington law, one of the general purposes of
the provisions governing the definitions of offenses is to "forbid and
prevent conduct that inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individ-
ual or public interests."' 6 The Model Penal Code also states that one
of the general purposes of the provisions governing sentencing and
treatment of offenders is "to prevent the commission of offenses. '"17
Not holding a passive parent responsible for the death of his or her
child frustrates these purposes because a passive parent's conduct of
not protecting a child from abuse "inflicts or threatens substantial
harm" to that child and does not prevent the death of the child.'8
These purposes are also furthered by holding a passive parent
accountable for his or her inaction, even though the passive parent has
supra note 11, at 685.
13. Tanck, supra note 11, at 685. A majority of the criticism about holding passive parents
responsible notes that many passive parents are also victims themselves, i.e. battered women.
This Note does not address the issue of Battered Women's Syndrome. For more information
regarding criticisms of holding passive parents responsible, see Howard A. Davidson, Child
Abuse and Domestic Violence: Legal Connections and Controversies, 29 FAM. L.Q. 357 (1995);
Michelle S. Jacobs, Requiring Battered Women Die: Murder Liability for Mothers Under Failure to
Protect Statutes, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 579 (1998); Linda J. Panko, Legal Backlash:
The Expanding Liability of Women Who Fail to Protect Their Children from Their Male Partner's
Abuse, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 67 (1995); Christine Adams, Note, Mothers Who Fail to
Protect Their Children from Sexual Abuse: Addressing the Problem of Denial, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 519 (1994). But see Jean Peters-Baker, Punishing the Passive Parent: Ending a Cycle of
Violence, 65 UMKC L. REV. 1003 (1997).
14. Liang & Macfarlane, supra note 10, at 399.
15. Johnson, supra note 11, at 375.
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.04.020(1)(a) (2000).
17. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2)(a) (1962). Washington declined to adopt subsections
of section 1.02 of the Model Penal Code, stating that these purposes "should be located with the
provisions dealing with those matters." JUDICIARY COMM. OF WASHINGTON STATE LEGIS-
LATURE COUNCIL, REVISED WASHINGTON CRIMINAL CODE 3 cmt.1 (Comm. Print 1970)
[hereinafter WASHINGTON LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL'S JUDICIARY COMM.].
18. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.04.020(1)(a) (2000); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(a)
(1962).
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a history of violence. 9 A passive parent would feel more compelled to
remove his or her child from an abusive situation if he or she could be
charged with a felony.2 ° Unfortunately, when a child dies from abuse,
there is presently only a remote chance that the passive parent will be
held accountable.21
Currently, under Washington law, a passive parent is not legally
responsible for the death of his or her child from abuse. State v. Jack-
son22 is a horrific illustration of the gaps in Washington's law
regarding the issue of who is responsible for the death of a child by
abuse. Because passive parents should be held responsible for the
death of their child from abuse, and because Washington's current
laws are inadequate, Washington's legislature should create a special
statute that would hold both abusive and passive parents culpable for
the death of a child resulting from abuse.2 1 Section II of this Note will
discuss State v. Jackson, including an analysis of both the majority and
dissenting opinions. Section III will demonstrate that Washington's
current laws are inadequate to hold passive parents responsible for the
death of their child. Finally, Section IV will describe several proposals
that would help fill the gaps of Washington's law.
II. STATE v. JACKSON-AN UNFORTUNATE EXAMPLE
A. Summary of the Case
In November of 1992, Michael and Laurinda Jackson became the
foster parents of two-year old Breighonna Moore; shortly thereafter
they received another foster child, an infant boy.24 In the early morn-
ing hours of March 12, 1993, Michael Jackson, accompanied by
Breighonna and the Jackson's other foster child, dropped his wife off
at work. 25 He returned home with the children and spent the morning
at home and at the park.26 Around noon that day, Michael Jackson
drove Breighonna to the emergency room at Valley Medical Center in
Renton, Washington and told the emergency medical technician that
19. Liang & Macfarlane, supra note 10, at 442.
20. Tanck, supra note 11, at 684.
21. Liang & Macfarlane, supra note 10, at 416.
22. 137 Wash. 2d 712, 976 P.2d 1229 (1999).
23. This Note will focus on holding a passive parent responsible for the death of his or her
child by abuse; it will not address child abuse that does not result in deaths or address child
abuse in the context of Battered Women's Syndrome.
24. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 716, 976 P.2d at 1230-31.
25. Id. at 716, 976 P.2dat 1231.
26. Id.
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his "daughter" had been "swinging on a swing and had fallen and hit
her head, and she wasn't breathing very well. ,27
Breighonna was immediately examined by Dr. Edward Bigler.28
After this exam, Dr. Bigler concluded that Breighonna was in critical
condition as a result of a "very serious injury" to the brain.29 When
questioned by Dr. Bigler and other staff about how Breighonna suf-
fered these injuries, Michael Jackson replied that Breighonna was
swinging in the park, he turned his back for a moment, and when "he
turned around [he] found [Breighonna] lying unconscious below the
swing. '"30 Dr. Bigler concluded that Breighonna's injuries were not
consistent with Michael Jackson's story; therefore, he asked the
hospital's emergency intervention team to contact Children's Protec-
tive Services. 31
Breighonna's serious condition required her to be transferred to
Harborview Hospital in Seattle.32 Before Breighonna was transferred,
Dr. Bigler informed personnel at Harborview that there was a possi-
bility of child abuse.33  At Harborview, Dr. Valerie Newman
examined Breighonna, who was still unconscious and unresponsive.34
Dr. Newman consulted with several other staff physicians and the
consensus was that surgical intervention would be futile and
Breighonna was going to die.3' Around midnight, Dr. Newman met
with the Jacksons and told them that she did not expect Breighonna to
live through the morning.36  Dr. Newman then inquired how
Breighonna had suffered her injuries.37 Michael Jackson reiterated the
story he told Dr. Bigler, but added that "a few days prior or possibly a
week prior [Breighonna] had been getting a hair cut and had bumped
her head on the sink" at the salon.38
Breighonna died on March 13, 1993, and an autopsy was per-
formed by Dr. Michael Dobersen.39 The autopsy revealed that
27. Id. (quoting Videotape Recorded Proceedings (VRP) at 68).
28. Id. at 716-17, 976 P.2d at 1231.
29. Id. (quoting VRP at A). Breighonna's injuries included a growing contusion on her
forehead, bruises on both ears, a faint bluish mark in the lower abdomen, discoloration on her
buttocks, and an abrasion on her vagina. Dr. Bigler also noticed that Breighonna's right pupil
was enlarged and both eyes were not responding to light. Id.
30. Id. (quoting VRP at 34).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 717-18, 976 P.2d at 1231 (quoting VRP at 166).
39. Id. at 718, 976 P.2dat 1231.
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Breighonna's death was caused by "a bilateral subdural hematoma
resulting from a blunt impact."4  Because of the severity of the
injuries4' and the fact that the injuries were inconsistent with Michael
Jackson's explanation, Dr. Dobersen classified Breighonna's death as a
homicide.42
The next day, Michael Jackson gave a statement to Detective
Mullinax of the King County Police.43 In this statement, Michael
Jackson repeated the story of Breighonna falling off a swing, but his
statement slightly varied from the statement given to various medical
personnel.44  He also described the incident where Breighonna
bumped her head on a sink at the hair salon.45
On that same day, Detective Hatch of the King County Police
took a statement from Laurinda Jackson.46  She confirmed her
husband's story of Breighonna hitting her head on the salon sink.47
She also admitted to Detective Hatch that she had spanked
Breighonna several times because Breighonna was having problems
with her toilet training.4" Michael Jackson, in a later interview with
Detective Mullinax, also admitted, "he had once spanked"
Breighonna.49
Michael and Laurinda Jackson were charged50 with second
degree felony murder,51 based on the predicate felonies of second
degree assault52 and first-degree criminal mistreatment.53  During the
40. Id.
41. Dr. Dobersen listed all of Breighorma's injuries that he observed, including a bilateral
subdural hematoma, a vaginal injury, a bruise near the right eye, bruises on both ears, lacerations
and abrasions inside her mouth, bruises on her buttocks, bruises on both arms, a bruise on the
left side of her crotch, a bruise on the lower quadrant of her abdomen, hemorrhages on both
arms, several hemorrhages on her scalp, and a hemorrhage on her left thigh. Id. at 718 n.1, 1976
P.2d at 1231 n.1.
42. Id. at 718, 976 P.2d at 1231 (quoting VRP 340).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 718, 976 P.2d at 1232.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting VRP at 629). This interview was held in Jacksonville, Florida, on March
24, 1993, following the Jacksons' arrest in that city. Id. at 718-19 n.2, 976 P.2d at 1232 n.2.
50. Id. at 718-19, 976 P.2d at 1232.
51. "A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:... (b) He commits or
attempts to commit any felony.., and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime... he,
or another participant, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants ... 
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.050(1)(b) (2000).
52. "A person is guilty of assault in the second degree if he or she, under circumstances not
amounting to assault in the first degree: (a) Intentionally assaults another and thereby recklessly
inflicts substantial bodily harm;.. . or (f) Knowingly inflicts bodily harm which by design causes
such pain or agony as to be the equivalent of that produced by torture." WASH. REV. CODE §
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trial, Dr. Bigler, Dr. Newman, and Dr. Roberta Winch, a doctor that
examined Breighonna at Harborview, all testified that Breighonna's
injuries were inconsistent with a fall from a swing. 4 In addition to the
testimony of the doctors who examined Breighonna, Dr. Feldman, a
pediatrician with a specialty in injuries related to child abuse, reviewed
Breighonna's file and testified Breighonna died from a head injury that
stemmed from a blunt impact trauma that, in his opinion, occurred
the morning of March 12, 1993."5 Dr. Feldman also agreed that
falling from a swing could not have caused Breighonna's injuries.56 In
addition to the testimony of all the doctors, Ausilene Griswold testi-
fied that on February 26, 1993, she cut Breighonna's hair and
Breighonna did not hit her head on a sink. 7
A number of people who observed Breighonna's injuries testified
that the injuries were not accidental and that Michael and Laurinda
Jackson made up stories attempting to explain these earlier injuries.5 8
For example, Dannette Wold testified that she noticed an "unusual
owie" on Breighonna's forehead and when she asked about it, Michael
Jackson responded that it was none of her business, he was the parent,
he would take care of it, and he did not need to answer to the rest of
the world.5 9 Linda Shanes testified that Breighonna had a "rather
large-sized scab on her forehead"; when she asked Michael and
Laurinda about the injury, Michael and Laurinda looked at each other"as if they weren't really sure whether they should tell [her] or what to
say, if they should say anything at all." 6  After this, Michael told
Linda that Breighonna had "gotten popped" by hot water when they
were making mashed potatoes.6'
Over the objection of the Jacksons, the trial court gave a jury
instruction that stated "unless there is a legal duty to act, more than
mere presence and knowledge of the criminal activity of another must
9A.36.021(1) (2000).
53. "A parent of a child, the person entrusted with the physical custody of a child.., is
guilty of criminal mistreatment in the first degree if he or she recklessly ... causes great bodily
harm to a child or dependent person by withholding any of the basic necessities of life." WASH.
REV. CODE § 9A.42.020(1) (2000).
54. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 719, 976 P.2d at 1232.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Brief of Respondent at 4-8, State v. Jackson, No. 35179-6-1, 87 Wash. App. 801,
944 P.2d 403 (1997).
59. VRP at 941, 944, State v. Jackson, No. 93-1-02060-7 (King County Super. Ct., 1994).
Dannette Wold also testified that the reason she asked about the "owie" was because she "wasn't
sure what could have caused" the injury. Id. at 942.
60. Id. at 679-80.
61. Id. at 680.
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be shown to establish that a person present is an accomplice; a legal
duty exists for a parent to come to the aid of their small children if
physically capable of doing so. ''62 The jury found both Michael and
Laurinda Jackson guilty of second degree murder.63 In special
interrogatories, the jury indicated that Michael and Laurinda Jackson
each committed the crimes of assault in the second degree and
criminal mistreatment in the first degree, and that these crimes"resulted in the death of Breighonna Moore." 64
The defendants appealed and the Washington Court of Appeals,
Division One, reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.6" The
court of appeals concluded that the trial court erred "by instructing
the jury, in essence, that a parent is an accomplice in the commission
of a crime if the parent fails to fulfill his or her 'duty' to 'aid' their
child who is being assaulted or criminally mistreated by another. ' 66
The court held that sufficient evidence was presented to support a
finding of guilt of second degree assault and that Laurinda Jackson
was a principal or an accomplice to second degree felony murder.67
The State petitioned for review and the Washington State Supreme
Court affirmed the court of appeals in all respects.68
B. Reasoning of the Majority Opinion69
The court began its analysis with the jury instruction that was
given:
Participant means an accomplice. A person is an accomplice in
the commission of a crime if, with knowledge that it will pro-
mote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he or she either:
62. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 719, 976 P.2d at 1232 (quoting Clerk's Papers (CP) at 57).
This is a technical passive parent case because evidence was presented that Laurinda Jackson also
abused Breighonna. However, an accomplice liability instruction was given because the final
blow to Breighonna's head that caused her death occurred on the morning of her death, and
Laurinda Jackson was at work when Michael Jackson struck the final blow. See State v. Jackson,
87 Wash. App. 801, 817-19, 944 P.2d 403, 412-13 (1997).
63. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 719, 976 P.2d at 1232.
64. Id. (quoting CP at 76-77, 142-43).
65. Id. at 719-20, 976 P.2d at 1232.
66. Id. at 720, 976 P.2d at 1232.
67. Id. However, the court of appeals also held that there was insufficient evidence to sup-
port the trial court's finding of first degree criminal mistreatment. Id. On this issue the court of
appeals dismissed the charge of first degree criminal mistreatment. State v. Jackson, 87 Wash.
App. at 809, 944 P.2d at 408. This will be discussed later in this Note. See infra Sections II and
III.
68. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 716, 976 P.2d at 1230.
69. This Note only deals with the issue of accomplice liability. It does not discuss the issue
of whether the jury instruction was harmless error, whether the evidence at trial supported a
charge of criminal mistreatment, or whether evidence was sufficient to support Laurinda Jack-
son's conviction.
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(1) solicits, commands, encourages, or requests another person
to commit the crime or (2) aids or agrees to aid another person in
planning or committing the crime.
The word "aid" means all assistance whether given by words,
acts, encouragement, support, or presence. A person who is
present at the scene and ready to assist by his or her presence is
aiding in the commission of the crime. Unless there is a legal
duty to act, more than mere presence and knowledge of the crim-
inal activity of another must be shown to establish that a person
present is an accomplice; a legal duty exists for a parent to come to
the aid of their small children if physically capable of doing so.7"
The court stated that this instruction varies significantly from
Washington Pattern Jury Instruction (WPIC) 10.51,71 which reads,
[A person who is an accomplice in the commission of a crime is
guilty of that crime whether present at the scene or not.] [sic]
A person is an accomplice in the commission of a crime if, with
knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of a
crime, he or she either: (1) solicits, commands, encourages, or
requests another person to commit the crime; or (2) aids or
agrees to aid another person in planning or committing a crime.
The word "aid" means all assistance whether given by words,
acts, encouragement, support, or presence. A person who is
present at the scene and ready to assist by his or her presence is
aiding in the commission of the crime. However, more than
mere presence and knowledge of the criminal activity of another
must be shown to establish that a person present is an
accomplice.7 2
The State argued that a foster parent who fails to come to the aid
of a foster child when that child is being assaulted or criminally
mistreated violates his or her duty to protect that child, thereby
making that parent an accomplice.7 3 The defendants responded that
Washington's accomplice liability statute does not impose criminal
liability on a person who fails to act when he or she has a legal duty to
act.74
70. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 720-21, 976 P.2d at 1233 (quoting CP at 57) (emphasis
added).
71. Id. at 720, 976 P.2d at 1232.
72. WASHINGTON PRACTICE WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMI-
NAL WPIC 10.51 (2d ed. 1994).
73. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 721, 976 P.2d at 1233.
74. Id.
2000]
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The court agreed that parents have a legal duty to care for and
protect their children, and that failure to do so may result in civil
detriment, such as termination of parental rights.75 However, a
parent's or foster parent's failure to come to the aid of his or her child
is not a crime unless the criminal statute includes failure to act when a
legal duty to act exists.76 The court then examined Washington's
accomplice liability statute to determine whether a person who fails to
act when he or she has a legal duty to act can be an accomplice, subject
to criminal liability. 77
Washington's accomplice liability statute states:
A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission
of a crime if (a) With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate
the commission of the crime, he (i) solicits, commands, encour-
ages, or requests such other person to commit it; or (ii) aids or
agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or
(b) His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his
complicity .78
The court stated "[i]t is readily apparent that this statute does
not extend accomplice liability to a person, much less a parent or
foster parent, based on the person's failure to fulfill a duty to come to
the aid of another."79  Because no language in the statute indicates
accomplice liability for failure to act, the court decided that the jury
instruction "was a notable expansion on the reach of the statute. "80
In coming to this conclusion, the court discussed two reasons
why the legislature's decision not to extend accomplice liability to
parents who fail to act was deliberate. 8' First, Washington's accom-
plice liability statute is based on the accomplice liability provision in
the Model Penal Code,82 which includes a provision that a person is an
accomplice if that person has a legal duty to act and fails to act.83
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.020(3) (2000).
79. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 722, 976 P.2d at 1233.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 723-24, 976 P.2d at 1234.
82. Id. at 722, 976 P.2d at 1234.
83. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (1962) states:
A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (a)
with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he (i)
solicits such other person to commit it; or (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such
other person in planning or committing it; or (iii) having a legal duty to prevent the
commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or (b) his conduct is
expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.
(emphasis added).
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Nevertheless, the legislature specifically chose not to include the
omission provision in the Model Penal Code. 4 The court referred to a
statement of the Legislative Council's Judiciary Committee, explain-
ing why the legislature specifically left out the omission provision."5
The committee stated that:
(1) as drafted, the language is over-broad and might be held to
encompass situations where accessorial liability should not
attach; (2) the rest of the section will cover all situations to which
the excluded subdivision was addressed without raising the
above-stated objection; and (3) the other jurisdictions examined
all excluded this subdivision. 6
Second, the court reasoned the legislature deliberately left the
omission provision out of the accomplice statute because the legisla-
ture imposed liability for failure to act in other criminal statutes.8 7
These statutes include first degree criminal mistreatment,8 second
degree criminal mistreatment,8 9 and duty to report abuse of a child.9°
Because the legislature included omission to act in these statutes, the
court "conclude[d] that [the legislature's] failure to include liability for
a failure to act in the accomplice liability statute was deliberate." 91
On the basis of these two reasons, the court decided that the
legislature "deliberately chose to not include omission liability in the
accomplice statute." 92 The court also indicated that the State had not
cited any Washington statutes or cases to support its notion that
accomplice liability should be extended.93 Instead, the State relied on
the argument that a parent's failure to act makes that person an
accomplice to a crime because the common law imposes a duty on a
parent to protect his or her child." The court agreed that a parent has
a duty at common law to protect his or her child, but it did not agree
that a parent's failure to act makes that parent an accomplice and
84. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 723, 976 P.2d at 1234.
85. Id.
86. WASHINGTON LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL'S JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 17, at 44-45
cmt. 1.
87. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 723-24, 976 P.2d at 1234.
88. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.42.020 (2000). See section III.C for the language of statute.
89. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.42.030 (2000), See section III.D for the language of statute.
90. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.030 (2000). See section III.E for the language of statute.
91. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 724, 976 P.2d at 1234. In United Parcel Service, Inc. v. State
Dep't of Revenue, 102 Wash. 2d 355, 361, 687 P.2d 186, 191 (1984), the court stated that it is an
"elementary rule that where the legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and
different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent."
92. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 724, 976 P.2d at 1234.
93. Id. at 724, 976 P.2d at 1235.
94. Id. at 724-25, 976 P.2d at 1235.
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criminally liable." The court held, "The fact that a common law duty
may have been violated does not constitute a crime."9 6
The State also argued that Washington should follow other juris-
dictions that have expressly included omission liability under their
statutes.97 The court stated that although liability for failure to act
may be good public policy, it "should resist the temptation to rewrite
an unambiguous statute to suit [the court's] notions of what is good
public policy."9" The statute should be fixed by the legislature, not
the court.99
Finally, the court addressed the dissent's opinion that the major-
ity failed to consider the second part of Washington's accomplice
liability statute.' Because neither side advanced the position of the
dissent, the court stated it would "have been improper for this court to
discuss the theory that the dissent advocates."10 1
C. Reasoning of the Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Talmadge claimed that the majority
"erroneously analyze[d] accomplice liability under Washington law
and ignore[d] long-standing principles of Washington law obligating
parents or persons standing in loco parentis to come to the aid of their
children."'0 2 According to Justice Talmadge, the flaw in the major-
ity's reasoning was that "it fails to give appropriate attention to" the
Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 9A.08.020(3)(b), which states
that a person is an accomplice if "his conduct is expressly declared by
law to establish his complicity.' 1 3 Justice Talmadge asserted that this
provision explained the statement made by the Legislative Council's
Judiciary Committee that "the rest of the section will cover all situa-
tions to which the excluded subdivision was addressed without raising
the above- stated objection."" 4
95. Id. at 725, 976 P.2d at 1235.
96. Id. In State v. Wissing, 66 Wash. App. 745, 755, 833 P.2d 424, 429 (1992), the court
held that Washington courts do not recognize common law crimes.
97. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 724, 976 P.2d at 1234.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 725-26, 976 P.2d at 1235. The dissent's opinion will be discussed fully in the
next section.
101. Id. at 726, 976 P.2d at 1235. See John Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 117 Wash. 2d
772, 785, 819 P.2d 370, 377 (1991) (refusing to provide a precedential ruling on a privacy issue
because the court "should not engage in conjectural resolution of issues present, but not
briefed.").
102. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 732, 976 P.2d at 1238 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 733,976 P.2d at 1239 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.020(3)(b)).
104. Id. at 733-34, 976 P.2d at 1239.
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Continuing his analysis, Justice Talmadge stated the Legislative
Council's Judiciary Committee statement also comports with com-
ment 6(e) to section 2.06 of the Model Penal Code, which states,
"Subsection 3(b) preserves all special legislation declaring that particu-
lar behavior suffices for complicity, whether or not it would suffice
under the standards of Subsection (3)(a)."' 5 Because of this, the dis-
sent reasoned that "the Legislature expressly contemplated a person
could be an accomplice if the person's conduct was expressly declared
by law to establish that person's complicity in the crime."106
Justice Talmadge argued that Washington has laws of complic-
ity, making a passive parent an accomplice. 7 For example, Washing-
ton's law regarding the duty of a witness of an offense against a child
or any violent offense states:
(1) A person who witnesses the actual commission of... (c) An
assault of a child that appears reasonably likely to cause substan-
tial bodily harm to the child, shall as soon as reasonably possible
notify the prosecuting attorney, law enforcement, medical assis-
tance, or other public officials .... (4) Failure to report as
required by subsection (1) of this section is a gross misde-
meanor. 8
The dissent further asserted that Washington's accomplice
liability statute captures statutes like the above within its scope." 9
Therefore, if either Laurinda Jackson or Michael Jackson watched the
other abuse Breighonna and did not report the abuse, the witnessing
party would be guilty of a misdemeanor.1 0 Also, under Justice Tal-
madge's reasoning, the Jacksons would be guilty under Washington's
accomplice liability statute."'
Justice Talmadge asserted that not only does Washington's law
regarding a duty to report child abuse establish the Jackson's complic-
ity, but both common law and administrative law "expressly establish
a parent's complicity in the conduct of another abusive parent." ' 2
Under Washington common law, failure of parents to fulfill their duty
to take care and protect their children may result in the imposition of
105. Id. at 734, 976 P.2d at 1239 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES
§2.06 cmt. 6(e) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.69.100 (2000).
109. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 734, 976 P.2d at 1239 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 734, 976 P.2d at 1240.
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criminal culpability or in the termination of parental rights.' The
Jacksons agreed to follow the common law and the Washington
Administrative Code provisions relating to foster parents, and agreed
in writing not to use any type of physical punishment and to report
any abuse.'14 Also, applicable administrative laws prohibit the use of
corporal punishment and affirmatively required the Jacksons to
protect people in their custody from child abuse or neglect."'
Justice Talmadge continued his dissent by stating the majority's
analysis "reads section 3(b) out of the statute.""' 6 According to Justice
Talmadge, "[t]he Legislature plainly meant something by its enact-
ment of RCW 9A.08.020(3)(b). If the law expressly declares certain
conduct establishes a person's complicity in the crime, the person is
guilty as an accomplice."" ' 7 Because of the statutory requirement to
report an assault on a child, Washington's common law duty of
parents to care for and protect their children, and the administrative
law provisions regarding foster parents, Justice Talmadge stated that
the "complicity required by section 3(b) is present here.""..8  Under
Justice Talmadge's reasoning, the trial court properly instructed the
jury on accomplice liability and the Jacksons' conviction should have
been upheld."9
D. Analysis of Washington's Accomplice Statute-Who Was Right?
In this case, both the majority and the dissent were correct in
their interpretation of Washington's accomplice liability statute. The
majority concentrated its efforts on RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a) 20 while
the dissent focused on RCW 9A.08.020(3)(b).12' Even though both
sides interpreted the respective sections correctly, the analysis pro-
vided in the majority opinion is more persuasive.
First, the State charged Michael and Laurinda Jackson with
second degree felony murder, alleging second degree assault and first
degree criminal mistreatment as the predicate felonies. 122  As the
113. Id. at 734-35, 976 P.2d at 1240.
114. Id. at 735, 976 P.2d at 1240.
115. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-73-048(1) (1999), states, "Corporal punishment is
prohibited," and WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-73-050 (1999), states, "Licensees shall protect
persons, while in the licensee's care, from child abuse or neglect as defined in RCW
26.44.020(12)."
116. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 735, 976 P.2d at 1240 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 735-36, 976 P.2d at 1240.
120. See id. at 720-26, 976 P.2d at 1233-36.
121. See id. at 732-36, 976 P.2d at 1238-40 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 718-19, 976 P.2d at 1232.
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dissent advocates, Michael and Laurinda may have been guilty under
Washington's law requiring a witness to report any observed child
abuse, 123 but even if they were, the majority was correct in not
addressing this issue because the parties did not brief it. In Doe v.
Puget Sound Blood Center,124 the Washington Supreme Court held that
it "should not engage in conjectural resolution of issues present, but
not briefed.' ' 125 Michael and Laurinda Jackson were not charged with
failure to report abuse, and the State did not brief this issue or advance
it during oral argument. As a result, under Puget Sound Blood Center,
the court should not have addressed this issue on appeal. Thus, the
majority did not read "section 3(b) out of the statute" as the dissent
claimedY.2 6 Rather, the court could not have addressed section 3(b)
because the issue was not properly presented.
Second, the majority was correct in finding that Washington's
accomplice liability statute does not include criminal liability for
failure to act when there is a legal duty to act. 27  Under Rhoad v.
McLean Trucking Co.,128 when the intent of the legislature is clear,"this court should not read into a statute matters which are not there
nor modify a statute by construction. "129 The court provided two
reasons why the legislature did not intend to extend liability to omis-
sions: the legislature did not adopt the language from the Model
Penal Code regarding accomplice liability and the legislature included
the failure to act in other statutes, but not the accomplice liability
statute.13 0
Because the legislature did not adopt section 2.06(3)(a)(iii) of the
Model Penal Code and, instead, imposed liability for omission in
other statutes, the court properly concluded that the legislature's
intent was not to extend the accomplice liability statute to omissions.
Because the legislature's intent is clear, under Rhoad, it was proper not
to read "matters which are not there" into the accomplice liability
statute and not to modify the accomplice liability statute by including
liability for omissions."'
Even though the dissent properly interpreted Washington's
accomplice liability statute, Michael and Laurinda Jackson were not
123. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.69.100 (2000).
124. 117 Wash. 2d 772, 819 P.2d 370 (1991).
125. Id. at 785, 819 P.2d at 377.
126. See Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 735, 976 P.2d at 1240 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 722, 976 P.2d at 1233.
128. 102 Wash. 2d 422, 686 P.2d 483 (1984).
129. Id. at 426, 686 P.2d at 485.
130. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 723-24, 976 P.2d at 1234.
131. See id. at 734, 976 P.2d at 1234 (quoting Rhoad, 102 Wash. 2d at 426, 686 P.2d at
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charged for failure to report abuse. In fact, when the dissent ques-
tioned the State's counsel during oral arguments, it was evident from
the State's response that it had not given any consideration to RCW
9A.08.020(3)(b). 3 2 Although the dissent was logically correct in its
analysis, the majority was correct to not follow this analysis.
Both the majority and the dissent were correct in a sense, but the
majority's reasoning properly controlled the case based on the issues
before the court. The next problem to analyze is why Washington
laws failed to hold these two people responsible for the tragic death of
Breighonna Moore.
III. WHY Do WASHINGTON LAWS FAIL?
Several statutes in Washington appear at first glance to hold
passive parents culpable for the death of their children by abuse.
Unfortunately, in State v. Jackson, the gaps in these laws did not help
Breighonna Moore during her life. An analysis of Washington law
demonstrates that passive parents often are not held responsible for
the death of their child by abuse.
A. The Inadequacy of the Accomplice Liability Statute
Washington's accomplice liability statute states that a person is
an accomplice if he or she, with knowledge that it will further the
commission of a crime, encourages another person to commit a crime,
or aids in the planning and commission of a crime, or if the accom-
plice's conduct is "expressly declared by law to establish his complic-
ity." '133 This statute is inadequate because in Jackson, the Washington
Supreme Court held that this statute did not include liability for
failing to act.'34 By setting this precedent, a passive parent cannot be
held criminally liable as an accomplice for the death of his or her child.
The only way to change this is through the legislature. This holding
is a perfect example of the gaps in Washington law.
B. The Inadequacy of the Criminal Mistreatment Statutes
Under Washington's criminal mistreatment statutes, a person is
guilty of first-degree criminal mistreatment if a person having physical
custody of a child recklessly causes "great bodily harm to a child" by
withholding any of the "basic necessities of life."' 35 Under this stat-
132. Id. at 726 n.8, 976 P.2d at 1235 n.8.
133. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.020(3) (2000).
134. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 726, 976 P.2d at 1235.
135. WASH. REV. CODE§ 9A.42.020(1) (2000).
A parent of a child, the person entrusted with the physical custody of a child or
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ute, a passive parent can be held responsible for withholding any of
the "basic necessities of life" from his or her child. Unfortunately,
this statute is inadequate because Washington defines the "basic
necessities of life" as "food, water, shelter, clothing, and medically
necessary health care."' 36 This statute does not protect children from
child abuse; it only protects children from parents who fail to provide
them with the "basic necessities of life" as defined in the statute.
The Jacksons were originally charged with and found guilty of
first degree criminal mistreatment, but the Washington Supreme
Court upheld the court of appeals decision to dismiss these convic-
tions because of insufficient evidence.'37 The State contended that the
Jacksons failed to provide Breighonna "shelter," including the protec-
tion of a child from assault. 3 ' This argument was rejected by the
court of appeals, which held that "shelter" means "housing or protec-
tion from the elements"; not protection from an assault.'39 Because
there was no proof that the Jacksons withheld "housing or protection
from the elements" from Breighonna, the supreme court upheld the
court of appeals decision to dismiss the felony murder charge against
the Jacksons to the extent that it was based on the predicate felony of
first degree criminal mistreatment. 4 ° Furthermore, the court of
appeals held that because Breighonna's injuries were inoperable, the
Jacksons withheld medical care, but the evidence was insufficient to
show that withholding the medical care caused Breighonna great bodi-
ly harm.' Undoubtedly, after Jackson, this statute does not apply to
child abuse.
Thus, Jackson demonstrates this statute does little to protect
children from physical or sexual abuse, and it does even less to hold
either the abusive parent or passive parent responsible for their child's
death.
Washington's second-degree criminal mistreatment statute holds
that persons having physical custody of a child are guilty when their
activity either "creates an imminent and substantial risk of death or
great bodily harm" or "causes substantial body harm by withholding
dependent person, or a person employed to provide to the child or dependent person
the basic necessities of life is guilty of criminal mistreatment in the first degree if he or
she recklessly, as defined in RCW 9A.08.010, causes great bodily harm to a child or
dependent person by withholding any of the basic necessities of life.
Id.
136. WASH REV. CODE § 9A.42.010(1) (2000).
137. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 728, 976 P.2d at 1237.
138. Id. at 728, 976 P.2d at 1236.
139. Id. at 728, 976 P.2d at 1237.
140. Id.
141. State v. Jackson, 87 Wash. App. at 808-09, 944 P.2d at 408.
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any of the basic necessities of life." '142 A reasonable statutory interpre-
tation would seem to include a situation where a passive parent could
be guilty for allowing a child to be abused by the other parent, because
the passive parent would be "creat[ing] an imminent and substantial
risk of death or great bodily harm" to that child. Unfortunately,
courts have not interpreted the statute as such. In State v. Dunn,'43 the
court of appeals held that the statute requires the following: (1) the
defendant must be a parent or guardian; (2) the victim must be a child
or dependant; (3) the defendant must have acted recklessly, the
defendant's actions must have created an imminent and substantial
risk of death or great bodily harm, and (4) the defendant must have
caused the death or harm by withholding the basic necessities of life.'44
The court defined the basic necessities of life as "food, shelter, cloth-
ing, and health care."' 45 On the basis of Dunn, a court cannot hold a
passive parent liable for the physical abuse of his or her child because
the abuse is not caused by withholding the basic necessities of life.' 46
As in first degree criminal mistreatment, a passive parent is only
responsible when he or she fails to provide the child with the basic
necessities, and protection from child abuse is not one of those basic
necessities.
C. The Inadequacy of the Duty to Report Statutes
In Washington, the duty to report offenses against children
requires a person to report an assault against a child if it appears that
assault is "reasonably likely to cause substantial bodily harm to the
child."' 47  However, a person is not required to report the assault
against a child if that person has a reasonable belief that making the
report will endanger himself or herself, or any other person in the
household.148
142. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.42.030(1)(a) and (b) (2000).
A parent of a child, the person entrusted with the physical custody of a child or
dependent person, or a person employed to provide to the child or dependent person
the basic necessities of life is guilty of criminal mistreatment in the second degree if he
or she recklessly, as defined in RCW 9A.08.010, either (a) creates an imminent and
substantial risk of death or great bodily harm, or (b) causes substantial bodily harm by
withholding any of the basic necessities of life.
Id.
143. 82 Wash. App. 122, 916 P.2d 952 (1996).
144. Id. at 127, 916 P.2d at 954.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.69.100(1)(c) (2000).
148. WASH. REV. CODE§ 9.69.100(4) (2000).
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This statute is also inadequate because the State may decide not
to charge a passive parent under it; even if a passive parent is charged,
the penalty only amounts to a gross misdemeanor. In Jackson, the
State did not charge either Laurinda Jackson or Michael Jackson under
this statute.'49 However, if, for example, Laurinda Jackson observed
Michael Jackson beating Breighonna, she would be guilty of a gross
misdemeanor under this statute.
In addition to being convicted under the statute itself, the dissent
asserted that the Jacksons, if guilty under this statute, should also be
liable as accomplices.' Even though the accomplice statute would
apply, a strong argument can be made the Jacksons would only be
accomplices to failing to report child abuse, and not accomplices to
felony murder.''
Washington also has a statute requiring teachers, healthcare
professionals, law enforcement officers, and similar people who work
with children to make a report to proper law enforcement agencies if
they have "reasonable cause to believe that a child has suffered abuse
or neglect."'5 This statute also applies to any adult who has "reason-
able cause to believe that a child who resides with them" has "suffered
severe abuse." '' "Severe abuse" includes
149. One possible reason for not charging the Jacksons under this statute could be that they
were already charged with felony murder. See Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 715, 976 P.2d at 1230.
150. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 734, 976 P.2d at 1239 (Talmadge, J., dissenting). RCW
9A.08.020(3)(b) states a person is an accomplice if "[h]is conduct is expressly declared by law to
establish his complicity."
151. Justice Talmadge's dissent is not clear as to whether Michael or Laurinda Jackson
would be an accomplice for failing to report child abuse or felony murder. This issue has not
been addressed in Washington. The conclusion Justice Talmadge advocated seems to be that
the accomplice liability statute would hold Michael or Laurinda Jackson as an accomplice to fel-
ony murder. However, it seems more logical that if the accomplice liability statute applied, the
passive parent would only be an accomplice to a failure to report child abuse, not felony murder.
Because the Jacksons were not charged under this statute, until this issue is addressed by the
court or by the legislature, one can only speculate whether accomplice liability would really be
effective in holding a passive parent criminally liable for the death of his or her child.
152. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.030(1)(a) (2000).
When any practitioner, county coroner or medical examiner, law enforcement officer,
professional school personnel, registered or licensed nurse, social service counselor,
psychologist, pharmacist, licensed or certified child care providers or their employees,
employee of the department, juvenile probation officer, placement and liaison special-
ist, responsible living skills program staff, HOPE center staff, or state family and
children's ombudsman or any volunteer in the ombudsman's office has reasonable
cause to believe that a child has suffered abuse or neglect, he or she shall report such
incident, or cause a report to be made, to the proper law enforcement agency or to the
department as provided in RCW 26.44.040.
Id.
153. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.030(1)(c) (2000).
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[a]ny single act of abuse that causes physical trauma of sufficient
severity that, if left untreated, could cause death; any single act
of sexual abuse that causes significant bleeding, deep bruising,
or significant external or internal swelling; or more than one act
of physical abuse, each of which causes bleeding, deep bruising,
significant external or internal swelling, bone fracture, or uncon-sciousness. 5
A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor if he or she knowingly
fails to make a report."'5
This statute is similar to the statutory duty to report child abuse
discussed above.S6 The same inadequacies associated with the failure
to report abuse statute apply to this statute as well. As with the failure
to report child abuse statute, the State did not charge either Laurinda
Jackson or Michael Jackson under this statute. However, even if the
Jacksons were charged and convicted under this statute, they would
only be guilty of a gross misdemeanor. 57
Also, a court could hold a passive parent criminally liable as an
accomplice under this reporting statute. 58  The accomplice statute
would apply, but, like the failure to report child abuse statute dis-
cussed above, the argument can be made that the Jacksons would only
be accomplices to a failure to report child abuse, and not to felony
murder."5 9
D. The Inadequacy of the Homicide by Abuse Statute
Washington's homicide by abuse statute states that a person is
guilty of homicide by abuse if the person causes the death of a child
and the person has engaged in a pattern or practice of assault or
torture of the child. 6 ° While this statute holds the abusive parent
responsible, it has two flaws that make it inadequate to hold a passive
parent responsible. First, this statute applies only to the abusive
parent. It includes nothing about the culpability of passive parents.
154. Id.
155. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.080 (2000).
156. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.69.100 (2000).
157. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.080 (2000).
158. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.020(3)(b) states a person is an accomplice if "[h]is
conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity."
159. See supra note 151.
160. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.055(1) (2000).
A person is guilty of homicide by abuse if, under circumstances manifesting an
extreme indifference to human life, the person causes the death of a child or person
under sixteen years of age.... and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or
practice of assault or torture of said child, person under sixteen years of age ....
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Second, this statute only applies if the abuser "has previously engaged
in a pattern or practice of assault or torture of said child."161 Michael
and Laurinda Jackson were not charged under this statute, perhaps
because there was no evidence of prior abuse. The statute is effective
if there is a pattern of abuse, but questions arise when a pattern cannot
be established because the first beating is fatal. Even though this
statute would seem to effectively address child abuse, the problems
described above make this statute inadequate to hold a passive parent
responsible.
Despite all these laws that would seem to apply to the Jacksons'
situation, each, as demonstrated, failed to hold the Jacksons responsi-
ble for Breighonna's tragic death. Thus, under current Washington
law, a parent who stands by and does nothing while observing his or
her child's abuse, or even the child's death, is not adequately punished
for the abuse and murder of the child. This result requires correction.
IV. WHAT SHOULD WASHINGTON DO TO FILL THE GAPS?
As shown above, the court has no power under Washington law
to remedy this problem. In Jackson, the court stated its position on
changing the law clearly: "The State's public policy argument is bet-
ter addressed to the Legislature, which may, of course, choose [sic] to
impose accomplice liability for a defendant's failure to act. If the
legislature does, however, it should do so expressly."' 62 The solution
to these inadequacies lies in the legislature. Below are several solu-
tions that address Washington's problem of not holding passive
parents responsible for the abuse or death of a child.
A. Adopt Section 2.06(3)(a)(iii) of the Model Penal Code
One possible solution would be to add section 2.06(3)(a)(iii) of
the Model Penal Code to Washington's accomplice liability statute. 163
This section states that a person is an accomplice if "having a legal
duty to prevent the commission of the offense, [he or she] fails to
make proper effort so to do.' 164 This provision has been used in other
states to hold a passive parent responsible for the death of his or her
child by abuse. 61 However, while including this language would hold
161. Id.
162. 137 Wash. 2d. at 725, 976 P.2d at 1235.
163. Several states have included this provision of the Model Penal Code. See ALA. CODE
§ 13A-2-23 (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-403 (Michie 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 271
(1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-222 (1999); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 502.020 (Banks-Baldwin
2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6 (West 2000); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02 (West 1999).
164. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(iii) (1962).
165. See, e.g., Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1997).
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a passive parent responsible, the broad language may pose additional
problems. Under Washington law, a person has a legal duty to report
any child abuse observed, 16  and Washington law establishes a class of
people, much broader than parents, who have a legal duty to report
child abuse when they have reasonable cause to believe that such
abuse has occurred.'67 If the language of section 2.06(3)(a)(iii) of the
Model Penal Code was added to Washington's current accomplice lia-
bility statute, all of the people listed in the above statutes could
potentially be held as accomplices because Washington has estab-
lished a legal duty for these people. The situations illustrate the
Legislative Council's Judiciary Committee comment that the statute
could "be held to encompass situations where accessorial liability
should not attach."' 68 While adding this provision is possible, it is not
the best solution because of the potential for its overreaching criminal
liability.
B. Charge Passive Parents Under Both of Washington's Failure to
Report Abuse Statutes
Another possible solution is to charge passive parents under the
two failure to report abuse statutes.'69 This may seem like a simple
solution, but in fact, it is not at all adequate to solve the problem.
Under both statutes, the penalty is a gross misdemeanor. 17' A passive
parent who witnesses and allows the abuse or death of his or her child
deserves a harsher punishment than a gross misdemeanor. Because
the penalty does not fit the crime, this solution, while possible, is not
the best solution to this problem.
C. Expand the Definition of "Basic Necessities of Life" Under
Washington's Criminal Mistreatment Laws to Include
"Protection from Abuse"
If Washington expanded the definition of the "basic necessities
of life" to include "protection from child abuse," passive parents could
be held responsible under Washington's criminal mistreatment laws.
This could be done in one of two ways. First, the legislature could
add "protection from abuse" to the definition of the "basic necessities
166. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.69.100 (2000).
167. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.030(1)-(3) (2000).
168. WASHINGTON LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL'S JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 17, at 44
cmt. 1.
169. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.69.100 (2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.030 (2000).
170. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.69.100(4) (2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.080 (2000).
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of life."' 7 Second, the courts could choose to interpret the word"shelter" broadly enough to include protection from abuse. 7 2 Because
the courts have already declined to broaden the interpretation of the
word "shelter,"' 73 the only option available is for the legislature to add
"protection from abuse" to the definition of the "basic necessities of
life."
If "protection from abuse" was included, a passive parent could
be charged directly under Washington's criminal mistreatment statute
for withholding the "basic necessities of life."' 74  Second, a passive
parent could be charged as an accomplice because of the strong argu-
ment that withholding "protection from abuse" is "conduct expressly
declared by law to establish complicity.' 175
E. Adopt a New Statute Designed to Hold Both the Abuser and Passive
Parent Responsible for the Death of Their Child
All of the solutions suggested so far may solve the problem of a
passive parent's criminal liability. But, the drawbacks to these solu-
tions illustrate that Washington needs a special statute to adequately
punish passive parents for their role in the abuse or death of their
child. The solutions suggested thus far are not adequate or compre-
hensive enough to solve this problem.
Therefore, Washington should create a special statute to deal
with the murder of a child from child abuse. Bryan A. Liang176 and
Wendy L. Macfarlane 7  have proposed a statute that "allows for the
murder prosecution of principals, accomplices, and others who cause
the death of a child, either by direct abuse or by a failure to protect the
child from abuse."' 78 Their proposed statute would solve the prob-
lems with and fill the gaps of Washington law. Not only would this
171. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.42.010(1) defines the "basic necessities of life" as "food,
water, shelter, clothing, and medically necessary health care."
172. The Jackson court expressly declined to extend "shelter" to include protection from
child abuse. 137 Wash. 2d at 729, 976 P.2d at 1237.
173. See Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 729, 976 P.2d at 1237; State v. Dunn, 82 Wash. App.
122, 127, 916 P.2d 952, 954 (1996).
174. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.42.020 (2000).
175. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.020 (2000).
176. Professor Liang is a Dr. Arthur W. Grayson Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law
and Medicine, Southern Illinois University School of Law. B.S., Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1983; Ph.D., Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago, 1989;
M.D., Columbia University College of Physicians & Surgeons, 1991; J.D., Harvard Law School,
1995.
177. Ms. Macfarlane is Deputy District Attorney, Domestic Violence Unit, Ventura
County, California. B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1995; J.D., Pepperdine Uni-
versity School of Law, 1997.
178. Liang & Macfarlane, supra note 10, at 445.
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proposed statute clearly define the responsibilities of passive parents,
but it would also account for the weaknesses of the current legal
system."'7 Liang and Macfarlane propose the following statute murder
by child abuse:
A. A parent, guardian or custodian is guilty of murder by abuse
or neglect in the first degree if that person maliciously or intention-
ally engages in abuse or neglect that results in the death of a child
under that person's care, custody, or control.
B. A parent, guardian or custodian is guilty of murder by abuse
or neglect in the first degree if that person knowingly allows any
third person to maliciously or intentionally engage in abuse or
neglect that results in the death of a child under the care, custody
or control of that parent, guardian or custodian.
C. A parent, guardian or custodian is guilty of murder by abuse
or neglect in the first degree if that person recklessly allows any
third person to maliciously or intentionally engage in abuse or
neglect that results in the death of a child under the care, custody
or control of the parent, guardian or custodian, when the parent,
guardian or custodian has knowledge that the third person has
engaged in an act or previous pattern of abuse or neglect of such
child.
D. A parent, guardian or custodian is guilty of murder by abuse
or neglect in the second degree if that person recklessly engages in
abuse or neglect that results in the death of a child under the care,
custody or control.
E. A parent, guardian or custodian is guilty of murder by abuse
or neglect in the second degree if that person knowingly allows any
third person to recklessly engage in abuse or neglect that results in
the death of a child under the care, custody or control of the
parent, guardian or custodian.
F. For the purpose of this section:
1. "Child" shall mean any person under 18 years of age.
2. "Abuse" shall mean causing substantial physical pain,
illness or any impairment of physical condition by other
than accidental means.
179. Id.
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3. "Neglect" means threatening or impairing the physical,
mental or emotional health and well-being of a child by
failing or refusing to supply such child with necessary food,
clothing, shelter or medical care.
4. "Previous pattern" of abuse and/or neglect shall mean
one or more incidents of conduct that
a. Constitute an act of abuse and/or neglect, and
b. Are not so closely related to each other or connected
in point of time and place that they constitute a single
event.
5. A conviction is not required for an act of abuse or
neglect to be used in prosecution under this section includ-
ing an act used as proof of the previous pattern as defined in
F(4). A conviction for any act of abuse or neglect including
one which may be relied upon to establish the previous
pattern of abuse and/or neglect does not preclude prosecu-
tion under this section. Prosecution under this section does
not preclude prosecution under any other section of the
Code.
G. It shall not be a defense for any person charged with murder
under this statute that they could not or did not entertain a
criminal intent. 80
This proposed statute fills in many of the gaps in Washington
law and does not leave room for a court's inventive interpretation.
First, sections B and C solve the problem caused by not including an
omission to act in Washington's accomplice liability statute. These
sections explicitly allow the state to charge passive parents with first-
degree murder when their child dies from the abuse of a thirdperson. 1 ' This solves the problem of over-breadth expressed by the
Legislative Council's Judiciary Committee because the language
restricts the criminal liability to parents, guardians, and custodians.
Second, the proposed statute fixes the problem with Washing-
ton's current homicide by abuse statute. Unlike Washington's statute,
the proposed statute holds both abusive and passive parents responsi-
ble for the death of their child from abuse or neglect.' Furthermore,
the proposed statute alleviates the problem with Washington's
180. Id. at 446-47 (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 446.
182. Id.
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requirement that the abuser have "previously engaged in a pattern or
practice of assault or torture of said child."' 83 First, sections A and B
of the proposed statute do not include the term "previous pattern. '"184
This means the state may charge an abuser and a passive parent with
first-degree murder after the first incidence of deadly abuse. Second,
the proposed statute defines "previous pattern" as "one or more inci-
dents of conduct."'' 1 5 Unlike Washington's requirement for a pattern,
the proposed statute allows criminal liability after just one incident.
Finally, sections A through E all include the term "abuse or
neglect," and section F's definition of "abuse" and "neglect" solves
the problems with Washington's definition of "basic necessities of
life" under the criminal mistreatment statute. The proposed defini-
tion of "neglect" is basically the same definition as the one Washing-
ton has adopted for "basic necessities of life. '"186 Washington law
stops here, but the proposed statute goes on to fix the current problem
of not including "protection from abuse" by also including the term"abuse." The proposed statute defines abuse as "substantial physical
pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition by other than
accidental means."'87  This definition covers what Washington's
"basic necessities of life" fails to cover-the physical abuse of a child.
By including "abuse" along with "neglect," the proposed statute fills
the rest of the gaps in Washington's laws.
Adopting the proposed statute would still fill the gaps in Wash-
ington law and allow the state to hold both abusive and passive
parents criminally culpable for the death of their child from abuse.
Under this proposed statute, a court would find both Michael and
Laurinda Jackson guilty of murder by child abuse.
Legislators should conclude that "there is ... no logical or legal
reason for failing to charge all parents, guardians, or caretakers with
murder when they know of the abuse yet fail to protect their chil-
dren. '"18 Therefore, Washington should adopt the proposed statute or
a similar one. Washington laws are inadequate for protecting chil-
dren; the tragic death of Breighonna brings all these problems to light.
183. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.055(l) (2000).
184. Liang & Macfarlane, supra note 10, at 446.
185. Id.
186. The proposed statute defines "neglect" as "threatening or impairing the physical,
mental or emotional health and well-being of a child by failing or refusing to supply such child
with necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical care." Id. at 446-47. Washington defines
"basic necessities of life" as "food, water, shelter, clothing, and medically necessary health care.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.42.010(1) (2000).
187. Liang & Macfarlane, supra note 10, at 446.
188. Id. at 399.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Jackson demonstrates the inadequacies of Washington law in its
efforts to deter child abuse. A passive parent who watches his or her
child being abused should be as culpable as the abusive parent,
especially if the child dies. All of Washington's laws could not protect
Breighonna Moore from a tragic death, nor could these laws bring her
killers to justice. Because of the inadequacy of these laws, Washing-
ton needs to adopt a statute holding both the abusive and passive
parent responsible.
The Washington Legislature has declared,
The children of the state of Washington are the state's greatest
resource and the greatest source of wealth to the state of Wash-
ington. Children of all ages must be protected from child abuse.
Governmental authorities must give the prevention, treatment,
and punishment of child abuse the highest priority, and all
instances of child abuse must be reported to the proper authori-
ties who should diligently and expeditiously take appropriate
action, and child abusers must be held accountable to the people
of the state for their actions.IS9
To further this statement and to give the problem of child abuse
the "highest priority," Washington should adopt the proposed statute.
It is the best solution to fill in the gaps existing in current law because
it holds both abusive and passive parents accountable for the death of
their child. "The cruel death inflicted by two foster parents on a
three-year-old girl, a child who had already seen enough trouble in her
all too brief life, was a tragedy." 9 ' Washington needs to hold passive
parents responsible for the death of their children by abuse or, as in
Breighonna's case, no one is held accountable for the tragic death of a
child.
189. Child Abuse Reporting, 1985 Wash. Laws 259, new sec., § 26.44 (1965).
190. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 735-36, 976 P.2d at 1240 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
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